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I. INTRODUCTION
For the entire history of Wrigley Field, landlords of these buildings,
their tenants and guests have enjoyed watching major league baseball
games from these unique vantage points .... It would.., be absurd to
claim that persons lawfully on the property of the buildings near
Wrigley Field must avert their eyes in order to avoid
"misappropriating" these games.'
In 2000, the Chicago National League Ball Club ("Cubs" or "Club"),
owned by the Tribune Company,2 sought to enlarge its playing facility,
Wrigley Field.3 The proposal called for an estimated expansion of
approximately 2,000 seats to a ballpark that currently accommodates
39,059 people.4 The residents of Wrigleyville, the area surrounding
Wrigley Field, have vehemently rejected such plans to augment the
ballpark's seating capacity, stating that such additions would ultimately
increase "parking problems, traffic, litter, noise, crime, public urination,
and other nuisances" in the vicinity.'
1. Fran Spielman, Wrigley Neighbors Fire Back at Cubs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 7,
2003, at 7.
2. Casey Bukro, Rooftops Called Wrigley Charm, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2003, § 2, at 3.
3. Associated Press, 'The Free Ride is Over': Cubs Sue Owners of Rooftop Bars
Overlooking Wrigley (Dec. 17, 2002), available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
baseball/news/2002/l 2/16/wrigley-lawsuit-ap/. "Plaintiff owns and operates Wrigley Field,
the second oldest major league ballpark in the United States, and the Chicago Cubs baseball
team, a charter member of the National League." Complaint for Injunction, Damages and
Other Relief, Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Sky Box on Waveland, L.L.C., No.
02C 9105, at 5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2003).
4. Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Take Me Out to the Historic Landmark: Cubs Play Hardball
About Wrigley Field, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19, 2003, at A14. The proposal also called for the
addition of "12 more night games to [the Cubs'] current prescribed limit of 18." Id. The
team is seeking 30 night games. It should also be noted that Wrigley Field has the "smallest
[seating] capacity in the National League," which is the league in which the Cubs play. Id.
5. Id.
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In attempting to expand the ballpark, the Tribune Company began
planning and bargaining with Wrigley Field's neighbors. However, the
team owners were unable to negotiate any deal.6 During these discussions,
several rooftop businesses overlooking Wrigley Field backed the
neighbors' cause.7 The rooftop operators, who have created profitable
enterprises by selling tickets to fans (wishing to view games at Wrigley
from their rooftops),8 worried that their extraordinary views of the team's
playing field would be obstructed by the proposed venue expansion. 9
The Cubs frustration with this unraveling situation reached its zenith
on December 16, 2002, when the Club filed a lawsuit against the owners of
several of these rooftop businesses."° The Cubs argue that the rooftop
operators violate copyright laws and "directly compete" with the team for
ticket sales." Moreover, the Cubs aver that the rooftop business owners
have been "piggybacking" on team marketing in direct violation of the
Lanham Act, have misappropriated the team's property, and have been
unjustly enriched. 12
The outcome of this case will seriously affect several areas of the law.
The suit raises federal questions concerning the Copyright and Lanham
Acts. It also raises state questions concerning contracts, land use controls,
and misappropriation. While resolving these claims is important, this Note
focuses on several other questions that directly impact communications
law. For example, it is yet to be resolved whether the Cubs are suggesting
that the rooftop owners are infringing the Cubs' copyright by publicly
displaying telecasts of the team's games, or if they are alleging that the
rooftop owners (and their ticket-buying customers) are precluded from
even watching the Cubs' games from these nearby locations. If the court
determines that the rooftop owners are conducting legitimate business
practices, there remains the possibility that the owners will contract with
broadcasting entities and enter into lucrative telecasting deals (e.g.,
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Cubs Sue Rooftop Owners, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 17, 2002, at D2.
9. The City of Chicago has seemingly sided with the Wrigleyville residents and the
rooftop owners. The City moved to grant Wrigley Field historic landmark status, thereby
essentially guarding "against any alterations that could detract from the historical
significance of the 89-year-old ballpark." Elejalde-Ruiz, supra note 4. Furthermore, even
Chicago's Mayor, Richard Daley, supported the nonexpansion movement after a March,
2002, referendum revealed that eighty percent of the Wrigleyville neighbors demanded
community protections before any stadium expansion plans were to be approved.
10. Complaint for Injunction, Damages and Other Relief, Chicago Nat'l League Ball
Club, Inc. v. Sky Box on Waveland, L.L.C., No. 02C 9105, at 5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2003)
[hereinafter Cubs Complaint].
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id. at 10-12.
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providing broadcasters with magnificent rooftop views of Wrigley Field in
exchange for handsome monetary returns).
Even though the outcome of this case is uncertain, several important
questions have emerged. If sports events cannot be copyrighted, can a
sports team or other entity that publicly performs these events require that
nonpaying passers-by or fans of the performance direct their attention
elsewhere in order to avoid copyright infringement or unjust enrichment?
Further, can broadcast networks, filming from neighboring rooftops,
televise the performance without paying royalties or licensing fees to those
creating the event? To answer these questions, significant issues relating to
ownership of information and broadcasting rights must be addressed.
Although this case raises considerable Lanham Act and
misappropriation claims, this Note focuses on the copyright and unjust
enrichment claims involved in the Chicago Cubs case. Additionally,
because of the potentially immense precedential value of this case, this
Note is broadly tailored to illustrate the far-reaching effects that this case
may have on other sports entities and entertainment venues hosting public
performances. Clearly, this case raises several vital questions, and-
assuming that it goes to trial and that a judgment is rendered-its result
could significantly impact the sports and entertainment world, the legal
community, and the current landscape of communications law. 3
Part II of this Note focuses on the creation of a property right in sports
information while specifically addressing the actions of the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") and the judiciary in enabling such a
right. Further, mention is made of the significance of the Copyright Act in
establishing this property right in sports information. The remainder of this
Note discusses specific arguments relating to unjust enrichment (Part III),
the balance of sports property rights and land use rights (Part IV), and the
availability of copyright infringement claims for sporting or other
entertainment events (Part V).
13. "U.S. District Judge James Holderman set Feb. 23, 2004, as the trial date for a
lawsuit pitting the Chicago Cubs against rooftop bleachers surrounding Wrigley Field. But
Holderman urged the two sides to reach a settlement before then." Cubs, Rooftop Owners
Get I Year to Settle Feud, Cri. TRIB., Feb. 12,2003, sec. Metro, at 3.
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II. FCC AND JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF SPORTS INFORMATION
A. FCC Leniency
The situation in which the Cubs and the rooftop owners find
themselves is nothing new. As early as the 1920s, Major League Baseball
("MLB") entered into broadcasting contracts authorizing radio stations to
air World Series games.' 4 In 1934, A.E. Newton, who operated his own
radio station in his basement, wanted to broadcast the World Series without
having to pay broadcasting royalties to any of the interested sports
organizations. 5 Newton gave his listeners "running accounts" of the 1934
World Series games. He listened to authorized radio broadcasts and simply
relayed his version of the games' play-by-play action. 6
Because of these actions, Newton faced opposition when he attempted
to renew his broadcasting license.'7 The FCC originally thought that
Newton's actions violated the Communications Act of 1934.18 However,
after investigating Newton, the FCC determined that, although it did not
particularly agree with his actions, 9 Newton had not violated the
Communications Act.2" The FCC emphasized that since Newton had
confined his sports broadcasting career to the 1934 World Series, his
license would be renewed."'
B. Judicial Favoritism of Sports Property Protection
Newton's travails with the FCC initiated debate concerning
ownership of information and the property rights associated with sporting
events. Sports broadcasting issues were routinely brought to the FCC's
attention; however, the state and federal courts, not the FCC, were
14. Robert Alan Garrett & Philip R. Hochberg, Sports Broadcasting and the Law, 59
IND. L.J. 155,157 (1984).
15. Id. See In the matter of A.E. Newton, Statement of Facts and Grounds for Decision,
2 F.C.C. 281, 284 (1936) [hereinafter Newton]; see also Nat'l Baseball Hall of Fame, World
Series Programs, at http://www.baseballhalloffame.org/exhibits/onlineexhibits/
ws-programs/images/1934_tigers-game_7.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2003). The interested
organizations included Major League Baseball, the St. Louis Cardinals, and the Detroit
Tigers.
16. Garrett & Hochberg, supra note 14, at 157.
17. Id.
18. This section of the Act prohibited "rebroadcasting [an event], without consent, from
another station's programming." Id. See generally Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,
48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 325(a) (2000)).
19. Garrett & Hochberg, supra note 14, at 157. See generally Newton, supra note 15.
20. Newton, supra note 15, at 284.
21. Id. at 285.
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ultimately thrust into the middle of these controversies.22 Owners of sports
organizations thought that judicial forums were much more favorable than
the FCC had been, and thus pursued judicial review of these types of
cases." Amateur broadcasters "who sought to follow in Newton's
footsteps" proclaimed that the "running accounts" of the sporting events
were merely "news in the public domain" and argued that any person had
the right to disseminate such news.24 However, the sports organization
owners and the courts took a different view.25
In Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., a radio station
broadcast Pittsburgh Pirates' baseball games without the permission of the
Pirates organization,2 6 which had already licensed its radio rights to NBC.27
The Pirates sued to enjoin the unauthorized KQV broadcasts. They sought
a preliminary injunction, which the court eventually granted. In enjoining
KQV Broadcasting from covering the Pirates' games, the court held that
the Pirates organization, "by reason of its creation of the game, its control
of the park, and its restriction of the dissemination of news therefrom [sic],
had a property right in such news, and the right to control the use thereof
for a reasonable time following the games."28 The court further held that
KQV had
misappropriated the property rights of the Pirates in the "news, reports,
descriptions or accounts" of the Pirates' games; that such
misappropriation resulted in KQV's "unjust enrichment" to the
detriment of the Pirates; and that KQV's actions constituted "unfair
competition," a "fraud on the public" and a violation of unspecified
provisions of the Communications Act.29
This case clearly helped to establish the right in sports information
property.
22. Garrett & Hochberg, supra note 14, at 158.
23. Id. See Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Brdcst. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa.
1938); see also Nat'l Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 133 N.Y.S.2d 379 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1954)
(preliminary injunction), affid, 136 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954) (without opinion),
143 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1955) (final judgment) [hereinafter Fass]; Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Brdcst. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
24. Garrett & Hochberg, supra note 14, at 157-58.
25. Id.
26. Pittsburgh Athletic Co., 24 F. Supp. 490. See Robert L. Saltzman, Television News
Access to Exclusively Owned Sporting Events: A Comparative Study, 7 SPORTs LAW. J. 1, at
4 (2000). See generally Garrett & Hochberg, supra note 14, at 158.
27. Garrett & Hochberg, supra note 14, at 158.
28. Id. at 158 (citing S. REP. No. 387, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1953)).
29. Garrett & Hochberg, supra note 14, at 158. See also Fass, supra note 23.
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C. Fortification of Sports Property Rights Through Enactment of
the Copyright Act
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.," the Supreme
Court recognized exclusive property rights to the "Human Cannonball."'"
The Court held that an Ohio television station, which had secretly taped his
performance and subsequently broadcast it during a newscast, had
misappropriated his property right.32 Zacchini established that sports
organizers have a property right in the accounts and descriptions of their
events.33 However, the holdings of Pittsburgh Athletic Co. and Zacchini,
were "based on a claim of misappropriation of property rights, a claim
granted under state common law, which is preempted to the extent that
federal copyright law shall govern."34
In the 1970s, such federal law was established at the request of
professional sports leagues.3 Congress gave credence to the concept of
sports property rights through the establishment of the Copyright Act of
1976,36 which benefited sports organizations by providing copyright
protection to live sports broadcasts, thereby vesting the owners of these
telecasts with the exclusive right to publicly perform them.37 Nonetheless,
since the Act's promulgation, several challenges have been asserted
concerning the ownership of (and property rights in) sports information. In
any event, the creation of the Copyright Act "added a new dimension to the
sports property right concept established in KQV and Zacchini by
protecting the sports clubs' property right in the accounts and descriptions
of a televised sporting event, while at the same time preempting any state
misappropriation claim."38 However, these property rights potentially
conflict with other rights, such as the contract and real property rights
afforded to those who are fortuitously, and thereby lawfully, enriched. The
conflict between the Cubs and the rooftop owners is a classic example of
this conflict.
30. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
31. Id. at563.
32. Id. at 565-66. See Garrett & Hochberg, supra note 14, at 158; see also Saltzman,
supra note 26, at 4.
33. 433 U.S. at 578 (establishing that "entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First
Amendment protection).
34. Saltzman, supra note 26, at 4-5.
35. Garrett & Hochberg, supra note 14, at 161.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Saltzman, supra note 26, at 5 (emphasis added).
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III. THE CHICAGO CUBS' COMPLAINT
A. Have the Rooftop Owners Been Unjustly Enriched?
The Cubs assert property rights in the performance of games at
Wrigley Field because the team spends millions of dollars annually to
produce their home games.39 The Cubs are infuriated because, while the
rooftop owners reap enormous financial rewards,' they do not pay any of
the costs incurred in "fielding" a baseball team. Furthermore, the Cubs
adamantly argue that they have been damaged because they have not been
paid any licensing fees in exchange for granting the rooftop operators
rights to sell tickets to fans wanting to watch the Cubs games.4
The Cubs believe that the rooftop operators have violated the
Copyright Act and have been unjustly enriched by publicly selling
performances of Cubs' baseball games that are played at Wrigley Field.42
Also, the Cubs argue that the rooftop operators directly compete with the
Cubs by funneling revenues away from live Cubs games. The Cubs claim
that these activities have deprived them of millions of dollars in revenue,43
and they suggest that the rooftop operators have been unjustly enriched"
because their businesses are profitable solely due to the efforts and
expenditures of the Cubs organization.45
39. Cubs Complaint, supra note 10, at 11.
40. Id. at 12.
41. Id.
42. Cubs Complaint, supra note 10, at 12.
43. Id.
The Cubs provide a variety of seats from which to view open-air games at
Wrigley Field, including bleachers, box seats, lower and upper grandstand
seats and skyboxes. The Cubs sell seats to individuals, to companies and
other groups and have food and drink available for sale on individual and
group bases at many locations at Wrigley Field. The Cubs enhance the
experience of live games at Wrigley Field by showing telecasts of the games
at many points inside the ballpark.
Id. at 5.
On game days, [the rooftop operators] charge for admission to their rooftop
and private party facilities, with the per person charge reaching as much as
$150 or more. Some Defendants are charging up to $300 per person for
games during the 2003 season. Fans cannot gain access to Defendants'
rooftop and private party facilities unless the charge has been paid. In return
for payment of the entry charge, Defendants provide their patrons with the
ability to view Cubs games in person as they are played at Wrigley Field and
to partake in food and drink and also provide unauthorized performances of
the Cubs' copyrighted telecasts, for the entertainment of patrons and to
enhance their profits.
Id. at 6.
44. Id. at 12.
45. Id. at 12.
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B. Balancing Sports Property and Land Use Rights
The Cubs' sports property rights must be weighed against the rooftop
owners' real property rights. Since 1998, the rooftop businesses have
operated under City of Chicago licenses that expressly permit them to
operate as sites for watching Cubs home games.4 6 Moreover, the rooftop
business owners argue that the Cubs "forfeited their right to compensation
by 'acquiescing' to [the rooftop businesses'] for-profit operations for more
than 20 years," and by not raising any objections while the rooftop business
owners spent millions of dollars to secure the city licenses permitting their
continued operation.47 Furthermore, the rooftop business owners, like many
followers of A.E. Newton, argue that the "games are, by their very nature,
open air public performances," and they suggest that "no one has ever
questioned the right of people on the rooftops to watch the games."48
C. Copyright in Relation to Sports Property
At the heart of the Club's complaint is a call for the court to declare
the rooftop operators in violation of the Copyright Act. The Club believes
that by operating such business without a license from the Cubs, the
rooftop operators have unfairly infringed the team's copyrights. The Cubs
claim that other than the rooftop operators and their patrons, "essentially
everyone who watches Cubs games in person . . . and every entity that
transmits from Wrigley Field live visual and/or oral depictions of [Cubs]
games (from telecasters to radio broadcasters to Internet gamecasters) does
so pursuant to license from the Cubs, their opponent or Major League
Baseball."49
The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have
power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."5 It is this "Copyright Clause" that
gives Congress the authority to enact copyright legislation." In 1976,
Congress used its authority under this clause to promulgate the Copyright
Act.52 This Act provides that, "[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."53
46. Bukro, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
47. Spielman, supra note 1.
48. Bukro, supra note 2.
49. Cubs Complaint, supra note 10, at 2.
50. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
51. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.02 (2003).
52. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
53. Id. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
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Despite the Cubs' claim, the "fixation" requirement may bar the team from
asserting any rights precluding the rooftop businesses from having to pay
the Cubs royalties.
IV. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The Cubs complaint alleges that the rooftop owners have been
unjustly enriched.54 The Club claims that their neighbors should not be
allowed to profit from the Cubs' cost of sporting a team.5 The Club argues
that by taking the Cubs' property and using it as the essential part of their
multi-million dollar rooftop businesses, defendants obtain a "windfall" and
are unjustly enriched. 6
Clearly, Newton, Pittsburgh Athletic Co., and Zacchini establish that
the Cubs have property rights in their games. However, the question
remains as to the extent of these rights. The Cubs allege that the rooftop
owners "operate extremely profitable businesses because they take the
Cubs' property and divert the Cubs' revenues to themselves without paying
any of the costs required to, among other things, field a team and operate a
ballpark in order to participate in Major League Baseball."57 Intuitively, an
entity that provides a service should not want its "sweat of the brow" to
benefit anyone but itself, but the law is not so definitive.
A. The Restatement Position
The Restatement of Restitution states: "A person who has been
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution
to the other. 5' Restitution is a longstanding remedy under contract law59
and is necessary to make the damaged party whole. However, the parties
must be in privity of contract before a seemingly benefited party can be
required to pay any compensation to the other.' "A person is not required
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
Id.
54. Cubs Complaint, supra note 10, at 12.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §1 (1936) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
59. Id.
60. For an explanation of privity, see infra Part IV.B.
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to deal with another unless he so desires and, ordinarily, a person should
not be required to become an obligor unless he so desires."'" Furthermore, a
person who "officiously confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to
restitution therefor[e]," 62 and "a person who has conferred a benefit ... by
way of giving another services or by adding to the value of his land ...
should not be permitted to require the other to pay therefor[e] ."63
The rooftop owners should not be required to pay the Cubs anything.
A person on his or her own property should not be required to pay
restitution to a neighbor simply because that neighbor decided to publicly
display an entertaining event. The law should not require people, standing
on their own property to avert their eyes or plug their ears, in an attempt to
ensure that they will not be unjustly enriched. Such a requirement would
undermine the fundamental aspects of contract and property law. The
rooftop owners' fortune (or misfortune) is that their neighbor happens to be
the Chicago Cubs. These owners should not be forced to compensate the
team just because they happen to have adjoining properties.
B. Sole Element of Proximity
Privity is the "connection or relationship between two parties, each
having a legally recognized interest in the same subject matter."' "The
doctrine of privity means that a person cannot acquire rights or be subject
to liabilities arising under a contract to which he is not a party. '"65 The sole
element of proximity (i.e., the fact that Wrigley Field and the rooftop
operations are closely situated) should not compel a finding that the parties
are in privity of contract. By erecting a roofless ballpark, the Cubs
officiously bestowed a benefit onto their rooftop neighbors. The Cubs were
established in 187666 and for ninety years have played their home games at
Wrigley Field. 67 Team owners cannot now cry foul and claim that their
rooftop neighbors are being unjustly enriched. Surely, the rooftop owners
would not be able to sell tickets absent the Cubs' games at Wrigley Field.
Further, even though the Chicago skyline is magnificent, rooftop operators
61. RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, §2.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1217 (7th ed. 1999).
65. Id. at 1218 (quoting G.H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 558 (8th ed. 1991)).
66. Historical Analysis of the Cubs, at http://chicago.cubs.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/chc/
history/chc-history-.timeline.jsp (last visited Nov. 16, 2003). The team was established as
the Chicago White Stockings but renamed the "Cubs" in 1902. See also Chicago Cubs
Timeline-1900s, at http://chicago.cubs.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/chc/history/chc-history-
timeline_1900s.jsp (last visited Nov. 16, 2003).
67. Cubs Historical Account of Wrigley Field, at http://chicago.cubs.mlb.com/
NASApp/mlb/chc/ballpark/chc-ballpark-history.jsp (last visited Nov. 16, 2003).
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would certainly not be as successful in selling admission tickets to their
roofs without the Cubs' presence. 68 Nonetheless, the rooftop owners should
not be forced to pay restitution just because the rooftops happen to have
astonishing views of Wrigley Field. If the owners of the Cubs and owners
of other outdoor roofless sports and entertainment venues believe that by
displaying their product they have enormously profited their neighbors, to
their own financial detriment, they should consider investing in screens,
roofs, or domes that would conceal their facilities from their neighbors'
views. In terms of economics, that would solve the problem of unjust
enrichment.
V. LAND USE RIGHTS
A. Deppert v. Detroit Base-Ball Club
The Cubs' current squabble with their rooftop neighbors is strikingly
similar to what the Detroit Base-Ball Club encountered nearly a hundred
and twenty years ago. In 1886, John Deppert erected viewing stands on his
barn, charging visitors a fee to watch baseball games played in the Detroit
Base-Ball Club's park, which adjoined Deppert's land.69 Deppert also sold
refreshments to his barn-top patrons. As in the current Cubs' case, Deppert
sought approval by the city's board of building inspectors to declare his
facility safe and secure.7"
The Detroit Base-Ball Club asked the court to enjoin Deppert from
making such use of his buildings and premises.7 The court determined that
Deppert was legally entitled to use his premises for the purpose of
amusement and also as a means of collecting revenue from the sale of
refreshments.72 The court specifically held that, "[c]ourts cannot limit the
extent, up or down, to which a man may enjoy his property; and if he goes
higher than his neighbor, so long as he does not interfere with the rights of
others, or injure his neighbor, he subjects himself to no liability."73
The rooftop operations near Wrigley Field are selling food and drinks
to patrons-just as the court in Deppert held that a property owner is
legally entitled to do. Also as in Deppert, the rooftop owners overlooking
Wrigley Field have obtained city permits entitling them to use their
68. "Unlike bars and restaurants, Defendants' rooftop businesses operate only in
conjunction with Cubs' home games. At all other times, they stand idle." Cubs Complaint,
supra note 10, at 6.
69. Detroit Base-Ball Club v. Deppert, 27 N.W. 856 (Mich. 1886).
70. Id. at 857.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 858.
73. Id.
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facilities for the purpose of selling tickets to view Cubs' games. The
rooftop owners are simply putting their land to the use to which they are
entitled. They have erected stands and other costly accommodations to
entice patrons to pay admission to watch Cubs games. Until the Cubs erect
an obstruction that would block the rooftop views, the team cannot legally
prevent its neighbors from using their own land absent any interference or
injury to the Cubs' property. The Cubs would argue that they are, in fact,
being injured by the rooftop owners. However, such allegations of harm
must be determined by a court.
Furthermore, none of the rooftop owners are encumbered by any
covenants (disavowing property rights) in the Cubs' favor. If the Cubs
wanted to, they could have conducted negotiations with their rooftop
neighbors and bargained to acquire any such rights. In any event, the facts
of these two cases could not be more analogous, and it is clear that the
Deppert court, if faced with the Cubs case, would have ruled in favor of the
rooftop businesses.
B. Right to Observe and Record Events on Adjoining Land
A New Jersey court provided the same land use reasoning as Deppert
to determine the extent to which a landowner may observe the actions of
his or her neighbors. In N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer4 , the plaintiffs, Noble Oil
Company, operated a fuel waste oil facility on their property. 5 In its
complaint, N.O.C. argued that the defendant, whose property was adjoining
N.O.C.'s property "climbed a ladder propped against a tree near [N.O.C.'s]
property line so that she could observe [N.O.C.'s] activities .... She has
used binoculars, a camera and occasionally a telescope to observe [those
activities]."76 The defendant believed that N.O.C. had "constructed a fence,
a platform and underground tanks which violate[d] the local zoning
ordinance[s]. She [was] also concerned about oil spills on the property
which might seep through the ground and invade her lands."77 Upon
reporting her concerns to the township committee at a public meeting, the
defendant was advised by her town's mayor that, "she had no proof to
support her claims."78 The defendant sought to acquire such proof by
observing and recording N.O.C.'s activities.79 The court, referring to
Deppert, held that "[a] landowner cannot be restrained from erecting a
74. 484 A.2d 729 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
75. Id. Admittedly, this case was brought as an invasion of privacy complaint. The
Cubs do not make any such allegations against the rooftop owners.
76. Id. at 730.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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structure for the express purpose of overlooking the adjoining land,
although the reason for the erection of such structure is to observe
exhibitions on such adjoining premises. '"80
Under N.O.C. and Deppert, the rooftop owners around Wrigley Field
are not only entitled to observe and charge others to view Cubs' games, but
they may also record the activities at Wrigley Field. Taken together,
Deppert, N. O.C., and the Cubs' current suit coalesce into a significant body
of potential precedent, proposing that a property owner whose land is
adjacent to another's may take overt steps in erecting stands and charging
admission to watch the activities on the contiguous property.. . Moreover,
he and his patrons may record and photograph those activities with
impunity. Barring any copyright violation, such a right could hypothetically
permit the rooftop operators not only to charge fans to view the games from
the rooftops, but also to charge telecasters to set up cameras, microphones,
and other devices for the sole purpose of recording the games. By virtue of
owning the land adjacent to the Cubs, the rooftop owners are afforded this
right.
VI. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
A. Fundamentals of the Copyright Act
One must seriously consider the mandates of the Copyright Act
whenever original works of authorship are to be copied or recorded. The
Act sets forth three conditions for making a work copyrightable: (1) a work
must be fixed in a tangible form; (2) the work must be an original work of
authorship; and (3) it must come within the subject matter of copyright.8
Cubs' games played at Wrigley Field do not satisfy any of these conditions
of copyright creation. The Copyright Act suggests that "[a] work is 'fixed'
in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy is...
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. 82
Under this standard, Cubs' games are not fixed until recorded onto
videotape or some other tangible form of expression. Therefore, the games,
as observed live from the rooftops adjacent to Wrigley Field, are not
protected by the Copyright Act.
The Copyright Act further lists eight categories of "works of
authorship."83 Included among these categories are literary works, musical
80. Id. at 734 (citations omitted).
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
82. Id. § 101.
83. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
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works, dramatic works, and, notably, audiovisual works.8 4 Audiovisual
works (consisting of a series of related images, "intended to be shown by
the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic
equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any")85 are considered
fixed or embodied in a tangible medium. Courts have held that telecasts are
considered audiovisual works, and thus are copyrightable. 6 As illustrated
above, Cubs' games are not "fixed" until they are recorded. As such, they
cannot qualify as "audiovisual works" or under any of the other seven
listed categories of works of authorship.
Moreover, Section 102 of the Copyright Act, which delineates the
subject matter of copyright, has not been interpreted to implicitly or
explicitly include athletic events.8 7 Unrecorded performances are not
"fixed" in a tangible form and thus are not deemed copyrightable.8 8 A
sporting event, although it may be televised, falls within this category of
unrecorded and unfixed material.
B. NBA v. Motorola
The above analysis was borne in 1998, when the Second Circuit
considered whether sporting events in and of themselves are
copyrightable.89 The court specifically considered whether copyright law
was applicable to the actual athletic performances underlying sports
telecasts. The court answered this question with a resounding "no. 9 °
In the seminal case of NBA v. Motorola, the National Basketball
Association brought suit against Motorola, the manufacturer of SportsTrax,
a hand-held pager system that provided "real-time" sports scores and other
information, alleging commercial misappropriation under New York state
law.91 The court made mention of a footnote in Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 101.
86. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc., 805 F.2d at 668.
87. See NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2nd Cir. 1997) ("[A]lthough the list
is concededly non-exclusive, such events are neither similar nor analogous to any of the
listed categories.").
88. Baltimore Orioles, Inc., 805 F.2d at 675. "Among the many such works that are not
fixed in tangible form are . . .extemporaneous speech, 'original works of authorship'
communicated solely through conversations or live broadcasts, and a dramatic sketch or
musical composition improvised or developed from memory and without being recorded or
written down." Id. (citation omitted).
89. NBA, 105 F.3d at 846.
90. Id.
91. Id. Additionally, the NBA brought forth a number of other claims that were
dismissed by the district court. Loren J. Weber, Something in the Way She Moves: The Case
for Applying Copyright Protection to Sports Moves, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 317, 340-
41(2000).
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Major League Baseball Players Association,92 a Seventh Circuit opinion,
which hinted at the copyrightability of baseball players' on-field
performances. 93 However, the Second Circuit, holding that "professional
basketball games are not 'original works of authorship' protected by
copyright," 94 rejected this footnote as dictum.95 The court claimed that the
"'more reasonable' position is that athletic events are not copyrightable"
since "the number of joint copyright owners would include the league, the
teams, the athletes, umpires, stadium workers and even fans, who all
contribute to the 'work."' 96 Therefore, the court concluded, that the
Copyright Act was not intended to protect the authorship of these events.97
The legislative history of the Copyright Act suggests that the Second
Circuit's interpretation of the Act in NBA v. Motorola was correct. 98 "In
testimony before Congress in hearings prior to the adoption of the 1976
Copyright Act, the Register of Copyrights expressed doubt that '[a] game
itself, as a game, and activities of the participants, the players, are actually
copyrightable."' 99 Moreover, "[t]here is some indication that Congress
considered the application of copyright to sporting events such as football
games," and ultimately rejected the idea that sporting events were
copyrightable."° Thus, it seems clear that if Congress wanted to afford
athletic events copyright protection, it would have included them in Section
102 of the Act.1"' Additionally, the court in NBA v. Motorola rightly found
that, "[u]nlike movies, plays, television programs, or operas, athletic events
are competitive and have no underlying script.' ' °2
It is undisputed that the Cubs own the copyrights in the local telecasts
of their games, including each home game played at Wrigley Field, and
92. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
93. NBA, 105 F.3d at 846. "Players' performances possess the modest creativity
required for copyrightability." However, the court went on to state that "even if the
[p]layers' performances were not sufficiently creative, the [p]layers agree that the
cameramen and director contribute creative labor to the telecasts." Baltimore Orioles, Inc.,
805 F.2d at 669 n.7.
94. Weber, supra note 91, at 341 (quoting Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)).
95. NBA, 105 F.3d at 846-47. But cf. Morris Communs. Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 117 F.
Supp. 2d 1322 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that plaintiff could not gather real-time scores
without using defendant's real-time scoring system, and consequently, that plaintiff had not
shown a substantial likelihood that it would prevail on the merits).
96. NBA, 105 F.3d at 846 (quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 51, § 2.09F).
97. NBA, 105 F.3d at 841.
98. Weber, supra note 91, at 341.
99. Id. (citation omitted).
100. Id. (footnote omitted).
101. Id.
102. NBA, 105 F.3d at 846.
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carried on WGN-TV, WCIU-TV, CLTV and/or Fox Sports Net Chicago." 3
Therefore, the Cubs argue, the defendant rooftop owners have intentionally
and willfully 4 infringed upon the Team's copyrights in the telecasts by
giving unauthorized public performances of the games on defendants'
premises for the entertainment of patrons and for the enhancement of the
business and revenues of the rooftop owners.0"
Assuming they have not assigned those rights to others, a sports club
or other entertainment entity owns a copyright in the telecasts of its games
or performances if they are simultaneously "fixed" in a tangible medium."0
Also, since a broadcaster produces the telecasts of such games or
performances and creates and artistically develops these telecasts, he is also
afforded a copyright in the telecasts.'0 7 Nonetheless, the game, sport, or
other publicly displayed performance, is nothing more than an
accumulation of facts.' 8 Neither the sport/entertainment organization nor
the broadcaster has any rights to the underlying product in and of itself.
The court in NBA v. Motorola reasoned that, "[t]he 'fact/expression
dichotomy' is a bedrock principle of copyright law that 'limits severely the
scope of protection in fact-based works."' Clearly, no author may copyright
facts or ideas. Rather, "'[t]he copyright is limited to those aspects of the
work-termed "expression"-that display the stamp of the author's
originality.""' ° In so finding, the court in NBA v. Motorola declared that,
"Although the broadcasts are protected under copyright law, the district
court correctly held that Motorola ... did not infringe NBA's copyright
because they reproduced only facts from the broadcasts, not the expression
or description of the game that constitutes the broadcast.""0..
C. Copyright in One Event Afforded to Several Entities
A Seventh Circuit ruling reinforces the idea that a parade, an event
similar to a sporting event, is not afforded copyright protection. In
Production Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co.,"' a
parade organizer brought suit against a television station, alleging violation
103. Cubs Complaint, supra note 10, at 6. It is also clear that the Cubs affix a copyright
notice to each of their telecasts: "Copyright 2002 Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc."
Id. at 10.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 102; see also Garrett & Hochberg, supra note 14, at 164.
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 102; see also Garrett & Hochberg, supra note 14, at 164.
108. NBA, 105 F.3d at 847; see also Weber, supra note 91, at 341-42.
109. NBA, 105 F.3d at 847 (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (citation omitted)).
110. Id.
111. 622 F. Supp. 1500, 1502 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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of copyright law and common law claims under the Lanham Act. The
plaintiff claimed that the defendant "intend[ed] to telecast the parade, using
[his] own personnel and equipment, simultaneously" with the only station
that had exclusive rights to broadcast the parade.112 The court held that the
parade contained "no original creative authorship" and rejected the
plaintiff's claims." 3 The court maintained that the telecast of the parade,
like the telecast of a sporting event, was "a work of authorship fixed
simultaneously with its transmission only for purposes of copyright
protection from videotaping ... or secondary transmissions .. .[and did]
not extend to prevent another simultaneous live telecast by another
television or radio station..... 4
Since sports and other events like parades cannot be copyrighted, the
rooftop owners can watch and even record the Cubs' games. Clearly,
baseball cannot be copyrighted; only the recording of the on-field action,
not the action itself, can be copyrighted. Thus, the rooftop owners have a
legitimate argument that if they film the Cubs' games from their rooftop
vantage points, they will essentially own a copyright in those recordings.
Further, it is undoubtedly true that these rights would be of considerable
value to the rooftop businesses."1 5
However, it is worth noting that broadcasters may be hesitant to
contract with the rooftop owners or similar entities for fear of backlash
from MLB, MLB teams, or other sports organizations like the National
Basketball Association, National Football League, and the National
Hockey League. Broadcasters may want several different camera angles,
on-field microphones and access to coaches, players and other team
personnel both on and off the playing surface. By contracting with
operations like the rooftop businesses, established broadcasters may lose
such access and, as a consequence, prominence. Nevertheless, less-
sophisticated broadcasters may simply wish to have one vantage point and
may relish the opportunity to contract with the rooftop owners for these
copyright privileges.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1503 (citation omitted).
114. Id. at 1504 (citation omitted); see also WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926
F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that broadcasting Boston marathon without permission of
Boston Athletic Association is not a Lanham Act violation and does not create an inference
that broadcast is somehow official).
115. "Twenty-four sports channels, like ESPN and Fox Sports News, currently pay
copyright owners for use of their highlights in other shows not geared to immediate
coverage of current events. For example, ESPN pays a fee to Major League Baseball ... for
the rights to show extended highlights of baseball games during a half-hour program geared
exclusively for baseball." Saltzman, supra note 26, at 14-15.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Sports and entertainment are undoubtedly major industries in
American culture and society. A key reason that sports and entertainment
have become mainstays among consumers is constant saturation through
broadcasts on television, radio, the Internet, and other media. Because of
the high stakes and high dollar figures associated with sports and
entertainment, owners of such entities fervently argue that they are afforded
rights in all their creations and products. However, these arguments are
untrue. When factors such as land use, contract, and property law are
weighed against the ownership rights involved in the dissemination of
sports information, the rights in sports property must lose, barring any
copyright or other protections.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the FCC and the courts
have explicitly created a possessory ownership of sports information.
Furthermore, the Copyright Act has established clear guidelines delineating
the extent to which a work of authorship, as well as sports property, can be
duly protected. Clearly, the Copyright Act affords owners of originally
fixed material copyright protection, but that which cannot be copyrighted
cannot be protected. There is no question that unfixed works are not
entitled to protection and that they do not fall within the scope of the
Copyright Act. Excluding telecasts, sports and other entertaining acts are
works that cannot be copyrighted because they are merely factual events.
They are not afforded any protection unless "fixed in a tangible medium of
expression."1 16
Because these events lack legal protection, any person who decides to
film or record such events may do so. Moreover, landowners who have
visible access to adjacent properties (which publicly display entertaining
events) may themselves record, film, broadcast, and distribute such
recordings, or they may assign such rights to others (e.g., broadcast
networks). Additionally, if they or their assignees do film the events, their
recordings (or broadcasts) will result in copyright protection in their newly
affixed creation, and the original creator of the performance is granted
absolutely nothing.
116. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
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